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Where Are You, Congress?
SILENCE RINGS IN CONGRESS AS JUVENILE
OFFENDERS REMAIN IN PRISON FOR LIFE
INTRODUCTION
When Evan Miller was fourteen years old, he made a poor
decision to set a fire that resulted in the death of his violent drugdealing neighbor.1 This decision almost landed Miller in prison for
the rest of his life.2 The phrase “children are different,”3 however,
has held great power in the United States court system. After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, courts could no
longer sentence children to death nor could they give sentences of
life in prison without parole (LWOP).4 Thus, young Evan Miller
got a second chance at a real life.5 Neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress, however, has provided clear guidance for the
constitutionality of de facto life sentences.6
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that
“the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders.”7 The Court reasoned that juveniles should be treated
differently from adults and ultimately receive less jail time8 for
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 468 (2012).
See id. at 469.
3 Id. at 480.
4 Id. at 479. The term “LWOP” is known and used by preeminent scholars in
this field and will be treated as such in this note. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of
Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22
NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 9 (2008); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and
Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 684
(1998); Julian H. Wright Jr., Note, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not
Much of a Life at All, 43 VAND. L. REV. 529, 532 (1990).
5 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
6 A de facto LWOP sentence tacks on years to the original sentence, which
equates to a lifer spending the rest of their life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Julian Zhu, Know More: De Facto Life Sentences, RESTORE JUST., https://restorejustice.org/
know-more-de-facto-life/ [https://perma.cc/QG68-Q7CA].
7 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. In Miller, the Court expanded a prior decision in Graham
v. Florida, which held that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole for a non-homicidal
crime constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and therefore violates the Eighth
Amendment. See id.; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
8 The Supreme Court in Miller used the precedents of Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S.
551 (2005) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) to come to the conclusion that children
1
2
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crimes committed during childhood, due to diminished culpability
and higher probability of reform.9 Miller set a standard that
emphasized a rehabilitative nature to the juvenile justice system
due to juveniles’ “lack [of] maturity and a fully developed sense of
responsibility” during the commission of a crime.10 Additionally,
courts will take into consideration, and in some cases weigh
heavily, the fact that children are especially vulnerable to
negative influences.11
Thus, Miller advanced the principle that juvenile defendants
deserve special considerations during sentencing; however, several
questions remained about the applicability of this general rule for a
juvenile already serving their now unconstitutional LWOP
sentences (lifers).12 The Supreme Court ruling in Miller is important
because it (1) established that mandatory minimums of LWOP for
juveniles were unconstitutional and (2) left a question as to how
courts should interpret “life without parole.”13 Four years later, in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that Miller must
be applied retroactively “because it necessarily carr[ies] a significant
risk that a defendant—here, the vast majority of juvenile
offenders—faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
[him/her].”14 The Court required states to permit all lifers, regardless
of the atrocity of the crimes committed, to be given the opportunity
to prove they have been rehabilitated and deserve a chance to be
granted parole.15
Miller, therefore, shifted the legal atmosphere for juvenile
sentencing by giving lifers an opportunity to present proof of
successful rehabilitation. Expectedly, this shift led to some pushback
in the judicial community and inconsistencies about whether de
facto LWOP constitutes a violation of the Supreme Court’s holding

ultimately are “less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
9 Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
10 Anna K. Christensen, Note, Rehabilitating Juvenile Life Without Parole: An
Analysis of Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 132, 134 (2013).
11 Id.
12 The term “lifers” is used broadly by many stakeholders in the field of criminal law
to refer to those serving life sentences and will be used throughout this note. See e.g., MARC
MAUER ET AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF “LIFE”: LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN
CONTEXT 1 (2004), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-meaning-of-life-longprison-sentences-in-context/ [https://perma.cc/7U2J-TYGQ].
13 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
14 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (first alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).
15 Id. at 736.
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in Miller16 and by extension, the Eighth Amendment.17 A de facto
LWOP sentence tacks on years to an offender’s original sentence
that equates to a lifer spending the rest of their life in prison without
the possibility of parole.18 Notably, there has been tension between
the Third and the Eighth Circuits as to the proper application of
Miller to de facto LWOP.19
In 2014, in light of the recent Miller decision, the District
Court of New Jersey ordered that Corey Grant, who committed his
crime at sixteen years old, be resentenced.20 The court then gave
Grant a new term of sixty-five additional years without parole.21
After scientific calculations, the court determined that this
sentencing would essentially equate to Grant’s life expectancy,
thereby becoming de facto LWOP.22 Analyzing the case under the
plain meaning of Miller, the Third Circuit joined the Seventh, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits and determined that de facto LWOP did, in fact,
violate the Eighth Amendment.23 But, when the Eighth Circuit
heard a case with similar facts in 2016, it decided that a new
sentence of six hundred additional months was not unconstitutional
because, under a formalistic analysis, the state did not violate the
Eighth Amendment by pursing de facto LWOP for juvenile
offenders.24 This Circuit’s decision diverged from most other circuits
in the country, particularly the Third Circuit, concerning the proper
application of Miller and by extension, de facto LWOP.
Thus, although Supreme Court precedent has changed the
way courts have sentenced juveniles in the United States, it has
failed to establish a clear and consistent rule for de facto LWOP
cases. Congress too has failed to help, remaining noticeably silent
on the issue. Congress recently reauthorized the Juvenile Justice
16 See, e.g., Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long?: Conflicting State
Responses to De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller
v. Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 3442 (2014) (“Responses in state courts to the
issue of virtual LWOP sentences after Miller . . . have varied significantly.”).
17 The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18 Zhu, supra note 6.
19 See United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 146 (3d Cir.), reh’g granted en
banc, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that it is unconstitutional for
non-corrigible juvenile offenders to spend their lives in prison through elongated prison
sentences); United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that
a juvenile offender can spend life in prison through term of years).
20 Grant, 887 F.3d at 136. Arguments for United States v. Grant were reheard on
February 20, 2019; at the time of this note, no new judgment had been released. See Grant,
905 F.3d at 285 (granting government’s petition for rehearing).
21 Grant, 887 F.3d at 135.
22 Id. at 142.
23 Id.; see Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1059–60 (10th Cir. 2017); McKinley
v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2016); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1188, 1192 (9th
Cir. 2013).
24 United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1018–19 (8th Cir. 2016).
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and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, which, although a
positive step for the treatment of juveniles in federal prisons, has
failed to provide any prevention for de facto life sentences to
juvenile offenders.25 Further, in late December 2018, Congress
signed into law the First Step Act, an act that focuses on prison
reform, but fails to protect juveniles sentenced to LWOP in the
federal prison system.26 Until Congress passes a bill directly
banning juvenile LWOP in the federal prison system, juvenile
offenders around the country may still find themselves spending
their entire lives in prison.
Children are not considered mature enough to vote, drink
alcohol, nor serve on a jury,27 and yet the criminal justice system
treats juvenile offenders as mature enough to pay for their crimes
for the remainder of their lives. Without a clear remedy in sight,
juvenile offenders face uncertain fates and unequal treatment in the
justice system, both on the state and federal level. Due to the serious
nature surrounding juvenile sentencing, it is crucial that Congress
band facto LWOP to fully establish that children are, in fact, treated
differently from adults in the United States. Additionally, in light of
courts’ conflicting applications of Miller and the inconsistencies this
creates, Congress must create a statute that ensures a resentencing
hearing for lifers after twenty years, and the new sentence given
must not exceed fifteen additional years.
Part I of this note examines the historical foundation of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller and what the aftermath
of its holding meant for court applications moving forward. Part
II discusses what Miller meant for the juvenile de facto LWOP
cases in both the Third and Eighth Circuits and how these
disagreements in interpretation have impacted juvenile
sentencing. Next, Part III analyzes each state within the Third
25 See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 11101 (2018)); Lacey Johnson, JJPDA
Reauthorization Passes Congress After 16 Years, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Dec. 13,
2018), https://jjie.org/2018/12/13/jjdpa-reauthorization-passes-congress-after-16-years/
[https://perma.cc/3LNX-J7CQ] (“The JJDPA sets core safety standards for juvenile
offenders that states must follow in order to qualify for federal grants. It also aims to
prevent delinquency and curb racial and ethnic disparities in juvenile justice systems.”).
26 See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Angela Chapin, Crime Bill Would
Not Prevent Kids from Being Sentenced to Die in Prison, Advocates Say, HUFFPOST (Dec.
7, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/first-step-act-juvenile-sentence-lifewithout-parole_us_5c097d8fe4b04046345a4049 [https://perma.cc/277X-NRD8].
27 See Fact Sheets – Age 21 Minimum Legal Drinking Age, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/minimumlegal-drinking-age.htm [https://perma.cc/ZZ86-98C4]; Juror Qualifications, U.S. CTS., https://
www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/juror-qualifications [https://perma.cc/9UAGDR97]; Voter Registration Age Requirements by State, USA.GOV. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.
usa.gov/voter-registration-age-requirements [https://perma.cc/MRT3-SHB3].
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and Eighth Circuits and emphasizes how even within the same
circuit, state level approaches vary greatly. Further, Part III
additionally discusses how Congress has failed to introduce a
statute to set uniform standards for juvenile sentencing on all
levels. Finally, Part IV searches for a solution and, in doing so
looks to international custom for insight on successful
approaches to juvenile sentencing. Further, Part IV suggests
that Congress enact a concrete law to apply consistency to
juvenile sentencing and repair the conflicting circuit decisions.
I.

BACKGROUND AND AFTERMATH OF MILLER

A.

What the Eighth Amendment Means for Juvenile
Sentencing

The Supreme Court and lower courts across the United
States have struggled with interpreting the Eighth Amendment.
Specifically, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause presents
problems with sentencing in the criminal justice system.28 The
Clause prevents the government from disproportionally punishing
a citizen for the crimes that they commit.29 This tension between
properly paying for one’s crime and excessive punishment peaked
in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in Penry v. Lynaugh, a
divided Supreme Court held that executing a mentally ill offender
did not violate the Eighth Amendment,30 however, on the same day,
the Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that the Constitution did
not bar capital punishment for offenders over fifteen years of age.31
This clear tension in employing of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause marked the beginning of a long road to
problematic application within courts throughout the years.
28 The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. “Traditional history explains this provision as outlawing torture and barbarous
punishments . . . .” Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis
and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 378 (1980).
29 For example, “[a] sentence of life imprisonment without parole may be
acceptable for some crimes, but it would violate the Constitution to condemn anyone to die
in prison for shoplifting or simple marijuana possession.” Bryan A. Stevenson, The Eighth
Amendment: A Contemporary Perspective, CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/
interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-viii/the-eighth-amendment-aprogressive-perspective/clause/10 [https://perma.cc/ND4A-QPN4].
30 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 340 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); William M. Robinson, Miller Time: The Eighth
Amendment Earthquake in Sentencing Law for Juvenile and Youthful Offenders and Its
Aftershocks in California, at 7 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.sdap.org/down
loads/research/criminal/wmr17.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9ES-VKUV].
31 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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In 2005, to cure some of the tension, the Court began to
rely on developmental research and neuroscience to ban adult
sentences on juvenile offenders as violative of the Eighth
Amendment.32 This new scientific approach helped the Court
determine that children could not possibly be considered to have
the same level of maturity as adults, and therefore punishing
children as such was considered cruel and unusual.33 The Eighth
Amendment includes “evolving standards of decency” as
objectively viewed by society and as subjectively viewed by the
Court’s analysis.34 By 2005, there was a shift in the Court’s view
of the categorical differences between children and adults. Courts
now apply the Eighth Amendment after examination of the age
and characteristics of the litigant in question.35
B.

The Buildup to Miller

In the landmark case Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed “that children are different from adults and that
those developmental differences are of constitutional dimension.”36
Although this ruling seemed like a new trend in the U.S. judicial
system, a group of progressive reformers, the “Child Savers,” had
advocated the concept that “children are different” as early as the
nineteenth century.37 This group championed the rights of juvenile
offenders with its goal to create a separate court for children based
on the belief that children were more likely than adults to be
rehabilitated and should be adjudicated as such.38 Cook County,
Illinois founded the first juvenile court, with its goal to separate
juveniles from adults and to provide more opportunities for
rehabilitation.39 Over the next twenty-five years, almost every
state in the country followed suit and established their own
juvenile courts.40 The concept of rehabilitation diminished over
time as the country pushed towards weighing retribution over
32 Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 285, 291 (2012).
33 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
34 Levick et al., supra note 32, at 292 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01
(1958)).
35 Id.
36 Robin Walker Sterling, “Children Are Different”: Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation,
and the “New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2013); see Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
37 Sterling, supra note 36, at 1023–24.
38 Id.
39 Levick et al., supra note 32, at 286.
40 See A.B.A. Div. for Pub. Educ., The History of Juvenile Justice, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.au
thcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT23-6PM9].
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rehabilitation.41 The United States’ judicial system slowly
developed into one that gave juveniles life sentences without the
possibility of ever achieving freedom.42 Ultimately, it was “public
sentiment [that] swayed the dramatic policy shift during the 1990s
that allowed for more juveniles to be tried as adults, subjecting
them to adult sentences.”43 However, the idea that children could
be rehabilitated and therefore deserved more lenient treatment in
the court system became part of a larger conversation in the
judicial system through a string of Supreme Court decisions.
In 2005, the Supreme Court began to rely on neurological
findings that showed the differences between children and adults
when it ruled on Roper v. Simmons.44 The Court used these
findings to identify three characteristics that differentiated
juveniles from adults:
(1) immaturity and underdeveloped awareness of responsibility,
manifesting itself in propensities to engage in reckless behavior and
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions; (2) a vulnerability
and susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure; and (3) less character development than
adults with more transitory, and fewer fixed, personality traits which
enhance a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation.45

Due to these findings, juveniles could not fairly receive a
death sentence, which historically had been saved for the nation’s
most dangerous criminals.46 The next time that the Supreme Court
viewed a case about juvenile sentences, it took the opportunity to
expand the view that children deserve to be treated differently. In
2010, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida held that life
sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders
convicted of non-homicidal cases violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and reasoned that the Constitution did not
allow such severe and irrevocable punishment for juveniles.47 At a
minimum, under the Eighth Amendment, juvenile offenders have
41 “Rehabilitation goes directly against the ‘tough on crime’ mantra that was
introduced in the 1980’s.” James Bernard et al., Perceptions of Rehabilitation and Retribution
in the Criminal Justice System: A Comparison of Public Opinion and Previous Literature, J.
FORENSIC SCI. & CRIM. INVESTIGATIONS, Oct. 2017, at 1, 1.
42 See Megan Annitto, Graham’s Gatekeeper and Beyond: Juvenile Sentencing and
Release Reform in the Wake of Graham and Miller, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 119, 122 (2014).
43 Annito, supra note 42, at 122.
44 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
45 Martin R. Gardner, Youthful Offenders and the Eighth Amendment Right to
Rehabilitation: Limitations on the Punishment of Juveniles, 83 TENN. L. REV. 455, 482
(2016); see Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
46 “Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow
category of the most serious crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the most
deserving of execution.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
47 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Levick et al., supra note 32,
at 299–300.
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a “right to be free from a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole.”48 When read together,
Graham and Roper provided the framework for courts that the
“Eighth Amendment . . . force[s] a more rigorous examination of
permissible sentencing options for juvenile offenders.”49 These
cases laid the groundwork for Miller and all the cases that follow
regarding juvenile sentencing.
C.

Miller, Montgomery, and the Aftermath

In 2012, the Supreme Court confronted Miller, a case
involving a fourteen-year-old boy charged with murder in the course
of arson, who was given a statutorily mandated punishment of life
without parole.50 One night, Evan Miller and his friend got into an
altercation with Miller’s violent drug-dealing neighbor, Cole
Cannon.51 Cannon grabbed Miller by the throat and Miller’s friend
hit Cannon over the head with a baseball bat in an effort to free
Miller.52 Once released, “Miller grabbed the bat and repeatedly
struck Cannon with it.”53 The boys covered up the evidence of their
crime and lit two fires around the trailer where Cannon’s body
remained. Cannon ultimately died from a combination of his injuries
and smoke inhalation. Due to his age, Alabama law initially
required Miller to be charged as a juvenile but allowed the case to be
removed to adult court.54 The state charged Miller as an adult for
murder in the course of arson, which carried a heavy mandatory
minimum of life in prison without parole.55 A jury found Miller guilty
and he began his sentence.56 The Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals later affirmed the decision because such punishment was
not overly harsh in comparison to the crime committed.57
After the Alabama Supreme Court denied review, Miller
appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari in 2011.58 The Court’s opinion turned mainly on
a belief that had been laid out for generations by Roper and
Gardner, supra note 45, at 487–88.
Levick et al., supra note 32, at 300.
50 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2011). This case also dealt with the trial
of another fourteen-year-old boy who the district court sentenced to LWOP for felony
murder and aggravated robbery; however, this note will only focus on the case of Evan
Miller. Id. at 465–66.
51 Id. at 468.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 468–69.
56 Id. at 469.
57 Id.
58 Id.
48
49
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Graham, that children are constitutionally different from adults
due to their diminished culpability and great prospects for reform.59
The majority took issue with mandatory minimums because it
fundamentally prevented the sentencing authority from assessing
the proportionality of the offender’s characteristics to the crimes
they committed.60 Ultimately, the analysis focused on the
individual application of the law to children who had different
upbringings.61 Miller put forth five unique factors to consider when
sentencing youth: “(1) age and its hallmark features—among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks; (2) family
and home environment; (3) circumstances of the offense; (4) legal
competency, i.e. ability to deal with police and lawyers; and (5)
possibility of rehabilitation.”62 The idea of empathy for children
came to the forefront of the conversation for juvenile sentencing.
In Miller, the Court acknowledged the horrendous crime
that Miller committed, but partially excused his conduct on the
drugs and alcohol present at the time.63 But the Court took its
analysis even further to take Miller’s “pathological background”
into consideration as contributions to the commission of his
crime.64 By the time he was fourteen years old, Miller had been
physically abused by his stepfather, neglected by his addict
mother, moved in and out of foster care, and had even attempted
suicide four times in his short life, the first time being at six years
old.65 Thus, although Miller deserved punishment for the murder
he committed, a judge needed to examine all of his individual life
circumstances before determining the appropriate sentence.66
Although the Court did not create a categorical ban on all
LWOP sentences, it did ban all mandatory minimums of LWOP
for juvenile offenders based on the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.67 Additionally, it held that
before sentencing juveniles, courts must view youth related
Id. at 477–78.
Id. at 474. After an offender is convicted, they return to court for a sentencing
judge to determine the amount of time that they will serve in prison. The sentencing judge
receives guidance from several sources in order to sentence a defendant and considers a
variety of mitigating factors. Id. at 476.
61 “[E]very juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other—the [seventeen]year-old and the [fourteen]-year-old . . . , the child from a stable household and the child from
a chaotic and abusive one.” Id. at 477.
62 Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses,
the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole
for Juveniles Is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149, 157 (2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
63 Miller, 567 U.S. at 478.
64 Id.at 478–79.
65 Id. at 467.
66 Id. at 479.
67 Id.
59
60
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mitigating evidence68 to determine the proper sentence for each
offender, since non-homicide offenders deserved an opportunity to
be released based on maturity and rehabilitation.69 Although the
Court focused mainly on LWOP sentences, its analysis “seemed
to indicate that individualized sentencing that incorporates the
mitigating factors of youth must always be used when considering
harsh or lengthy sentences for juvenile offenders.”70 Ultimately,
Miller emphasized the importance of individualized sentencing
that focused on the nature of the juvenile’s circumstances along
with their lack of maturity.71
In 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Montgomery v. Louisiana72 to decide if Miller should be applied
retroactively.73 The Court decided that Miller created a categorical
rule that made sentencing a juvenile to LWOP excessive, except for
the rare occasions where the crime reflected “irreparable
corruption.”74 It expanded Miller and held not only that courts
should apply Miller retroactively, but also that LWOP is
unconstitutional for almost all juvenile offenders, including the “vast
majority of juvenile homicide offenders.”75 In fact, a sentencing court
must determine that a juvenile offender is “irreparably corrupt or
permanently incorrigible” before it imposes a sentence of LWOP on
a juvenile.76 The Court explained, however, that finding a juvenile
worthy of such a sentence would be incredibly rare.77

68 Youth related mitigating evidence is a factor that courts consider before
sentencing that attributes some of the offender’s mistakes to characteristics associated with
youth and immaturity. Id. at 475–76.
69 See id. at 478; Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 157.
70 Scavone, supra note 16, at 3454; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
71 Four justices dissented and expressed their concerns that the majority made
no attempt to limit the scope of their decision and criticized the majority opinion as “a way
station on the path to further judicial displacement of the legislative role in prescribing
appropriate punishment for crime.” Gardner, supra note 45, at 491 (quoting Miller, 567
U.S. at 500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
72 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016). After Miller, state courts
across the country were left to decide if Miller’s holding was procedural or substantive. If
procedural, the ruling would not be applicable to the facts of previous cases and therefore
would not be applied retroactively. If substantive, courts would have to retroactively apply
Miller, which would mean the approximately 2,015 incarcerated persons serving
mandatorily sentenced LWOP at the time would receive new opportunities for parole
through resentencing hearings. Without a mandatory retroactive application, Miller meant
lifers in each state were not receiving the same level of treatment as some remained in
prison while others received new sentences. See id. at 734–35.
73 Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 152.
74 Id. at 159 (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 724).
75 Id. at 152; see Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
76 Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 172; see Montgomery, 136 S. Ct at 734.
77 “In fact, the majority mentions eight times in the opinion that only irreparably
corrupt juveniles may constitutionally receive sentences of life without parole.” Hoesterey,
supra note 62, at 173.
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Nevertheless, many states still refuse to comply with the
new “irreparable corruption” standard, as many states remain
content to leave discretion to the sentencing judge.78 One line in
Montgomery explains that neither Miller nor Montgomery
required a “formal fact-finding requirement.”79 Although Miller
did not impose a formal fact-finding requirement, states still
could not sentence a child to LWOP80 because “Miller established
that [juvenile LWOP] is disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment.”81 Regardless, several states have disregarded
Montgomery’s expansion and have only used the case to
recognize the retroactive application of Miller.82 Ultimately,
Miller created an inconsistency of two analytical approaches—
the plain meaning analysis and the formalistic analysis. This
conflict has led to uncertainty as courts across the country
struggle to resolve questions of juvenile sentencing.
II.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND EIGHTH CIRCUIT: AN
INTERPRETIVE SPLIT

A plain reading of Miller begins with the premise that
through the advancements in neurological development that
correlate with one’s progression of age, a juvenile’s deficiencies in
judgment are likely be reformed.83 This interpretation indicates
that the Court intended for juvenile offenders to be able to return
to society once neurological development is complete and thus
rehabilitation has occurred. Language that LWOP reflects “an
irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in
society[ ] [is] at odds with a child’s capacity for change,”84 logically
concludes that denying a juvenile the chance to be released back
into society is unconstitutional, regardless of the use of the phrase
“life without parole” in the sentence. Conversely, a formalistic
interpretation of Miller applies a narrowly defined set of rules.
Therefore, under this analysis, unless a court specifically
sentenced a juvenile to “life in prison without parole,” it would not
be unconstitutional. The Court did not indicate the proper
interpretation of its language and seemingly kept it vague.85 It is
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735; see Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 161.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735; see Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 161.
80 Stephanie Singer, Note, A Proposed Solution to the Resentencing of Juvenile
Lifers in Pennsylvania Post Montgomery, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 695, 728 (2018).
81 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735.
82 Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 161.
83 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.
84 Id. at 473 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
85 Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 156.
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illogical, however, that the Court intended only a specific phrase
to be unconstitutional, instead of the intent behind the words,
especially considering the elaborate language about the
possibility of rehabilitation for juveniles.86
A.

Plain Meaning Approach

Corey Grant was thirteen years old when he joined a
gang called E-port Posse, a group known to buy and sell multikilograms of cocaine on the streets of New York.87 In 1989, at
sixteen years old, Grant committed various crimes that
ultimately led to his arrest.88 In 1992, Grant was tried as an
adult and a jury found him guilty of conspiracy, racketeering
under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), and drug and gun possession.89 Additionally, in the
commission of his RICO crimes, Grant murdered a man and
attempted to murder another.90 At the time, there were
“mandatory Sentencing Guidelines of LWOP on the two RICO
counts, a concurrent forty-year term of imprisonment on the
drug-trafficking counts, and a five-year consecutive term of
imprisonment on the gun possession count.”91 In 1992, the court
sentenced Grant to LWOP for the RICO crime and a total of
forty-five concurrent years without parole for the other crimes.92
In 2014, in light of Miller, the District Court of New
Jersey granted Grant the opportunity to be resentenced.93 At the
resentencing hearing, “the District Court determined that
Grant’s upbringing, debilitating characteristics of youth, and
post-conviction record demonstrated that he had the capacity to
reform and that a LWOP sentence was therefore inappropriate
under Miller.”94 The District Court, however, determined that
instead of mandatory LWOP for his RICO conviction, Grant
deserved a new term of sixty-five years without parole to run
concurrently with the drug charges.95 At the time of the District
Court trial, Grant was forty-one years old and had already

Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–79.
United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir.), reh’g granted en banc,
opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018).
88 Id.at 135–36.
89 Id. at 136.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 134.
93 Grant made a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, requesting the court to vacate his
sentence. Id. at 136.
94 Id. at 135.
95 Id.
86
87
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served twenty-two years in prison.96 The new term of years
sentenced by the District Court would mean that, “assuming
good time credit,” Grant, at the earliest, would be eligible for
release at the age of seventy-two.97 On appeal, Grant cited
various life expectancy estimates and contended that his life
expectancy was seventy-two; thus, he would likely die in prison
for a crime he committed when he was sixteen years old.98
The Third Circuit relied on both Roper and Graham as its
foundation for the principle that LWOP for juveniles is a harsh
punishment, especially since a juvenile offender would spend a
greater percentage of their life in prison compared to an adult
offender with the same sentence.99 The court noted that Miller
encouraged individualized sentencing before imposing LWOP.100
Further, under Miller, courts were required to take into account
the youth-related mitigating evidence, such as immaturity,
family and home environments, incapacity and, importantly, the
potential for rehabilitation.101
The Third Circuit interpreted Miller using the plain
meaning approach and found that, “[t]hus, while not a categorical
bar, Miller effectively prohibits LWOP for nearly all juvenile
offenders.”102 Therefore, Grant applied the plain meaning of Miller.
Under this analysis, the Supreme Court could not logically have
intended that the inclusion of the word “life” made the sentencing
unconstitutional. Rather, courts employing the plain meaning
approach have maintained that, at some point, a juvenile will
become a rehabilitated and productive member of society and thus
is undeserving of confinement for the duration of their life.
The issue of de facto LWOP in Grant was one of first
impression for the Third Circuit.103 Ultimately, the court held that
it violated the Eighth Amendment because it is inherently
disproportionate to a crime committed by a juvenile who is
particularly vulnerable.104 Importantly, Grant interpreted the
plain meaning of Miller to apply not only to LWOP but to
sentences that systematically equate to LWOP for crimes
committed as juveniles.105 In order to give effect to this
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, the court emphasized
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

See id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
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that treating children differently from adults would be applied
across the board in all forms of sentencing.106 Further, “[a]
sentence for a juvenile offender who is not incorrigible but that
still results in [them] spending the rest of [their] life in prison does
not appreciate the categorical differences between children and
adults” that is laid out in the language of Miller.107 By finding de
facto LWOP constitutional, an offender would still spend the
remainder of their life in prison without the possibility of parole
and therefore, “it would make little sense if sentencing courts
could circumvent Miller and eradicate this constitutionally
required [standard] simply by imposing extraordinarily high
term-of-years sentences.”108
Although Miller is sufficiently silent on de facto LWOP,
the Grant court chose to interpret this silence as inclusive of all
sentences that would require a non-incorrigible109 juvenile to
spend the remainder of their life in prison.110 It reasoned that
Miller turned on the particularly harsh sentences that the
juveniles faced, not the sentence’s formal designation.111 Which
means that Miller’s main purpose was to prevent juveniles from
lifelong incarceration, not to simply rid the juvenile sentencing
system of the words “life without parole.” Therefore, the Third
Circuit found it is unconstitutional when, in one way or another,
a juvenile is faced with spending their life in prison.112 Ultimately,
the Third Circuit held that, “defendants such as Grant should
have a chance for release before retirement age. Following this,
the en banc Third Circuit vacated the court’s initial opinion and
judgment pending the en banc court’s decision.”113
B.

Formalistic Approach

Robert James Jefferson joined the 6-0 Tres gang when he
was sixteen years old and soon began participating in the gang’s
criminal activity.114 The state charged and convicted Jefferson of
Id. at 143.
Id.
108 Id.
109 The court separates two classes of juvenile offenders as “non-incorrigible”
offenders “who are capable of reform and ‘whose crimes reflect transient immaturity’” and
the very rare “incorrigible” offenders “who have no capacity for change and ‘whose crimes
reflect irreparable corruption’” Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Anton Tikhomirov, A Meaningful Opportunity for Release: Graham and
Miller Applied to De Facto Sentences of Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders, 60
B.C. L. REV. II.-332, II.-337 (Electronic Supplement, 2019) (emphasis omitted).
114 United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016).
106
107
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conspiracy to distribute drugs, participation in the firebombing
murder of five children when he was still sixteen, and a drive-by
shooting at seventeen.115 Due to the then-mandatory sentencing
guidelines, the court sentenced Jefferson to LWOP.116 After Miller,
Jefferson filed a petition and requested resentencing in light of the
ruling.117 The district court granted the petition, vacated the
original sentence and “varied downward” on “a sentence of [six
hundred] months in prison.”118
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit faced a similar question as
the Third Circuit about whether a sentence of de facto LWOP
violated the holding in Miller.119 Jefferson argued that his new six
hundred month—a fifty-year sentence—equated to de facto LWOP
because it did not meet the “contemporary standards of decency.”120
Such conclusion, he contended, could be drawn inexorably from the
plain meaning of Miller.121 The court of appeals in Jefferson
strongly disagreed, applied the formalistic approach, and said,
“[t]he Court in Miller did not hold that the Eighth Amendment
categorically prohibits imposing a sentence of life without parole on
a juvenile offender.”122 The court concluded that Miller’s categorical
ban on LWOP sentences did not explicitly include de facto life
sentences and therefore it did not even consider the argument of
expanding Miller to include it.123
The court employed a formalistic approach in their
interpretation of Miller and allowed a judge or jury the opportunity
to consider youth related evidence to mitigate before sentencing.124
Therefore, since the district court mitigated those circumstances in
Jefferson’s resentencing, it complied with what the court
understood as the only mandatory rule laid out in Miller.125 In fact,
the court even concluded that Jefferson had been “amenable to
rehabilitation” and, in the sixteen and a half years spent in prison,
he had “no disciplinary history.”126 Although the court expressed
Id.
Id. Additionally, the convictions and sentencing were affirmed on direct
appeal. See United States v. Jefferson, 215 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2000).
117 Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1018. Jefferson filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)
to have his sentence vacated. Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1017–18.
120 Id. at 1018.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1019.
124 Id. (“The [Miller] Court ruled that a sentencing court must make
‘individualized sentencing decisions’ that take into account ‘the distinctive attributes of
youth’ before it imposes a [LWOP] sentence on a juvenile.”(quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 472, 489 (2012))).
125 Id. at 1019.
126 Id. at 1020.
115
116
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sympathy for Jefferson’s childhood struggles, it still decided that
another fifty years in prison would be an acceptable new sentence
for Jefferson.127 During resentencing, “[t]he district court ha[d]
wide latitude to weigh the [childhood factors] and assign some
factors greater weight than others.”128 Based on the premise of the
formalistic approach, however, the simple exclusion of the word
“life” from a juvenile offender’s sentence means that someone like
Jefferson, for example, could be sentenced to one hundred
consecutive years in prison. Such an outcome could not logically fit
with the established presumption in Miller that juveniles are
constitutionally required to have an opportunity for release after
maturation and rehabilitation.
C.

Diametrically Opposed: The Third and Eighth Circuits

The Third and the Eight Circuits’ applications of Miller,
the plain meaning approach and the formalistic approach, differ
fundamentally. The Third Circuit reasoned that Grant intended
to focus on the treatment of juveniles over everything else.
Although Miller did not expressly extend its holding to include
those who were sentenced to de facto LWOP, its plain meaning
implied that offenders should not spend the rest of their lives in
prison for crimes committed as children.129 Therefore, in the Third
Circuit, when a non-incorrigible juvenile is sentenced to de facto
LWOP, that sentencing “violates the Eighth Amendment because
it lacks an adequate constitutional justification to make it a
proportionate sentence.”130 Under the plain meaning approach,
the language of the Supreme Court indicates that a juvenile can
be rehabilitated before dying in prison and must have the
opportunity for such rehabilitation.131 According to Grant, courts
must provide a juvenile offender with a “meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”132 Grant approached Miller in a way that
extended beyond the bare requirements by looking at the
meaning that the Supreme Court intended.
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit analyzed Miller through a
formulistic approach, which focused on the base requirement that
a juvenile is entitled to a hearing that weighs the mitigating
Id. at 1020–21.
Id. at 1021 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
129 See United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 143–44 (3d Cir.), reh’g granted en
banc, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018).
130 Id. at 143–44.
131 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
132 Grant, 887 F.3d at 144 (citation omitted).
127
128
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youth-related evidence of the crime into factoring the length of
sentencing.133 In the Eighth Circuit, the fact that a juvenile
offender has the opportunity to be resentenced under Miller is
technically sufficient under this narrow approach.134 Since Miller
did not condemn nor even speak to the notion of de facto LWOP,
individual courts have a right to decide the proportionality of the
new sentence.135 Even though the court expressed its empathy for
Jefferson and understood that he had been rehabilitated during
his time in prison, under a formalistic approach, a court can
decide that a juvenile is still worthy of spending their life in
prison.136 Emphasizing that the narrow formalistic approach
forces a court away from many of the ideas the Miller court
intended, such as the likelihood of juvenile rehabilitation and
reentry into society, a court could rely on Miller and still force a
juvenile offender to spend the rest of their life in prison, explicitly
contradicting the plain meaning of the language of the Court.137
D.

The Impact of the Circuit Split on Juvenile De Facto
LWOP

The two different approaches have exaggerated the already
grave consequences faced by incarcerated juvenile offenders, as
they have left juvenile offenders experiencing different
consequences, possibly for the same crime.138 Even in applying the
more expansive plain meaning approach, courts still defer to the
judges’ discretion by providing a caveat for “exceptional cases.”139
As a result of these competing interpretations, the split among the
circuit courts become problematic and created inconsistency in
sentencing across the country. This inconsistency, when
interpreting the same language, is indicative of the Miller court’s
failure to concretely lay out its reasoning.

Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1020.
See id.
135 See id.
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 Such grave consequences include exacerbated mental health issues, increased
recidivism, and a reduced probability of high school completion. For more information on
these consequences, see Anna Aizer & Joseph Doyle, What Is the Long-Term Impact of
Incarcerating Juveniles?, VOX (July 16, 2013), https://voxeu.org/article/what-long-termimpact-incarcerating-juveniles [https://perma.cc/7C9Y-H7FA]; Dev. Serv’s. Grp., Inc.,
Intersection Between Mental Health and the Juvenile Justice System, OFF. JUV. JUST. &
DELINQ. PREVENTION (2017), https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Intersection-MentalHealth-Juvenile-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NLS-URZQ].
139 ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10123, THIRD CIRCUIT
INVALIDATES DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCES FOR “NON-INCORRIGIBLE” JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 3 (2018).
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Ultimately, the confusion lies in whether Miller should be
applied in a narrow way, only to those specifically sentenced to
LWOP, or if Miller should be applied in a broad way, to encompass
all juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison.140 The Court must
address the confusion for the maintenance of justice within the
court system to avoid arbitrary and unpredictable punishments.141
Currently, the different approaches create opposing outcomes for
similar cases with similar facts. In applying the plain meaning
approach, the court would likely determine that individualized
standards mean holding the juvenile offenders to a different
standard when their crimes reflect transient immaturity.142 This
approach weighs such transient immaturity and the ability to be
rehabilitated most heavily, which trickles down to any sentence
that would disproportionately reflect the individualized standard.
Therefore, the Third Circuit, which applies the plain meaning
approach to Miller, is very likely to find that it should extend to de
facto LWOP for juveniles.143 Conversely, applying the formalistic
approach focuses on the narrow and rigid aspects of the law.144 A
court using this approach is likely to hold the severity of one’s
crimes at a greater weight than any other factor, especially the
ability of juveniles to be rehabilitated.145 The Eighth Circuit
analyzes Miller with the formalistic approach, which therefore
greatly narrows its holding.
The differing holdings in Grant and Jefferson demonstrate
the issue with having a circuit split on the interpretation of
Miller.146 Both offenders were serving prison sentences for
committing crimes such as murder and drug possession in the
late-1980s and early-1990s when they were teenage boys involved
in gangs.147 Both offenders came from similar backgrounds and
ultimately joined violent gangs and participated in crimes
associated with those groups.148 The Third and Eighth Circuits,
however, handled the similar sets of facts with the conflicting
approaches, which resulted in opposite outcomes. Grant had part
of his new sentence vacated and remanded for a new sentence
consistent with the plain meaning of Miller;149 Jefferson did not
See Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 183.
Id. at 179.
142 See United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir.), reh’g granted en
banc, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018); supra Section II.A.
143 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).
144 See supra Section II.B.
145 See United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he district
court properly gave significant weight to the extreme severity of Jefferson’s crimes . . . .”).
146 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 135; Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1018.
147 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 136; Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1017.
148 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 136; Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1017.
149 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 155.
140
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have as lucky of an outcome, as the court held that Miller provided
him with enough justice under the law to receive a resentencing
hearing, resulting in Jefferson spending another 600 months in
prison.150 It is incredibly problematic that Miller should allow for
two men with similar backgrounds, crimes, and stories to spend a
different number of years of their lives in prison.
III.

STATE ACTION TO ADDRESS YOUTH SENTENCING

A.

State Action in the Third Circuit

The last decade of Supreme Court jurisprudence on LWOP
has led to inconsistency as courts consider the sentencing of
juveniles throughout the country. Several states within the Third
Circuit have taken actions to ban juvenile LWOP completely,
while others have taken smaller steps to reducing the possibility
of resentencing a lifer to a de facto LWOP sentence, yet not
banning it all together. Therefore, despite residing in the same
circuit, a juvenile in New Jersey, for example, faces different
sentencing consequences than a juvenile in Pennsylvania.
New Jersey: A Strong Ban on Juvenile LWOP
In 2017, New Jersey eliminated all juvenile LWOP by
passing legislation that requires a sentence for juveniles
convicted of murder to be: “(1) a term of [thirty] years, during
which the juvenile is not eligible for parole; or (2) a specific term
of years that shall be between [thirty] years and life
imprisonment, of which the juvenile shall serve [thirty] years
before being eligible for parole.”151 This legislation has limited the
possibility for a juvenile to spend life in prison through LWOP or
de facto LWOP.152 After thirty years, the juvenile is either
released from prison or made eligible for a parole hearing.153 This
law inevitably had a major impact on the decision in Grant.154
Therefore, given state legislation and the holding in Grant,
juvenile offenders and current lifers are unlikely to be sentenced
to de facto LWOP in New Jersey.

See Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1019.
New Jersey, JUV. SENT’G PROJECT (2018), https://juvenilesentencingproject.
org/new-jersey/ [https://perma.cc/89VF-AHGV]; see N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-3(b)(1).
152 See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-3.
153 See JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 151.
154 See Grant, 887 F.3d at 141–42 (citing N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:11-3(b)(5)).
150
151
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Delaware: A Moderate View
Following Miller, Delaware lawmakers revised the state’s
sentencing laws to allow any juvenile offender sentenced to life in
prison for an offense other than first degree murder, to be eligible
for sentence modification after twenty-five years.155 Further, the
bill provides a sentencing judge discretion to allow a juvenile who
is convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life to seek
sentence modification after thirty-five years.156 Most importantly,
it permits the sentencing court to order that multiple terms of
incarceration imposed on a person for crimes committed, while
they were under the age of eighteen, to be served concurrently to
avoid de facto LWOP.157
Pennsylvania: A Mixed Bag
Pennsylvania has had a more difficult time with
consistency in juvenile sentencing. After Miller, “[w]hen the
juvenile lifer resentencing process began, Pennsylvania had the
largest number of individuals who were juveniles at the time they
committed their crimes and were later sentenced to life without
parole.”158 Today, juvenile LWOP remains a discretionary option
for juveniles convicted of murder, and any life sentence given to
juveniles excludes the possibility of parole.159 Although this
legislation seems disheartening for juvenile offenders, every lifer
may file a petition to be resentenced and, if a sentence is modified,
they may be considered for parole as required by state law.160 The
Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted legislation for
convictions after June 24, 2012 that states:161

155 An Act to Amend Title 11 of the Delaware Code Relating to Criminal
Sentences, S.B. 09, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Jan. 24, 2013), https://legis.delaware.gov/Bill
Detail/22426 [https://perma.cc/6J5T-E57A].
156 S.B. 09.
157 Id.
158 PA. BD. OF PROB. & PAROLE, “JUVENILE LIFERS”: FROM RE-SENTENCING TO
REENTRY, at 1 (2008), https://www.pbpp.pa.gov/Information/publications/Documents/Juve
nile%20Lifers%20Fact%20Sheet%20FINAL%20with%20quotes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T3N9HL6] [hereinafter “JUVENILE LIFERS”]. Further, as of 2013, Pennsylvania still had a greater
number of lifers who were actively serving juvenile LWOP sentences (444) than any other
state. See Alesa Liles & Stacy C. Moak, Changing Juvenile Justice Policy in Response to the
US Supreme Court: Implementing Miller v. Alabama, 15 YOUTH JUST. 76, 85 (2015).
159 “JUVENILE LIFERS,” supra note 158, at 1.
160 Id.
161 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1; see also “JUVENILE LIFERS,” supra note 158, at 1.
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Although LWOP for juveniles might still be an option, this
new law shows the potential for Pennsylvania to end juvenile
LWOP in the future.162
B.

State Action in the Eighth Circuit

Like the Third Circuit, the states within the Eighth
Circuit have been inconsistent. Overall, these state legislatures
have enacted more polarizing and conflicting laws than the states
in the Third Circuit. Some states have banned LWOP all together,
while others have taken an extremely lenient approach to
sentencing legislation. Therefore, a juvenile could again spend
drastically different lengths of time in prison for similar crimes,
even within the same circuit, simply because of the state in which
they committed the crime.
Minnesota: Confusion and Judicial Discretion
Since Miller, seven of the eight lifers were resentenced to
allow for an opportunity for release after serving thirty years of
their sentence.163 The Minnesota first degree murder statute,164
however, continues to permit a life sentence at the discretion of
the judiciary.165 Members from both sides of the aisle are pushing
for a bill to address the confusion.166 Minnesota is one of few states
that has not outwardly conformed to the majority of state
legislation around the country.167 It is likely that the fact that
juvenile LWOP and by extension, de facto LWOP, is not
prohibited in the state of Minnesota impacted the court’s decision
in Jefferson to allow the resentencing court to give Jefferson an
additional 600 months.168

162 See A State by State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85 [https://perma.cc/
2R95-DEV4].
163 Mike Cook, Should Life Without Parole Be a Sentence for the Most Heinous
Juvenile Offenders?, MINN. LEGIS. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/
SessionDaily/Story/13030 [https://perma.cc/2VJR-JWQF].
164 MINN. STAT. § 609.185.
165 Cook, supra note 163.
166 Id.
167 “Twenty-one states have never had life without parole for juveniles, [thirteen]
have a discretionary form of life without parole for juveniles and eight have changed laws
to include factors from the Miller case. There was no discussion of a penalty for failure to
comply or a deadline.” Id. (emphasis added).
168 United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 2016).
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Missouri: Poor Implementation
In 2016, the Missouri legislature passed a law that allows
juvenile offenders to seek parole in front of a review board after
serving twenty-five years of their sentence, which would avoid
both LWOP and de facto LWOP.169 The application of this law,
however, has been inconsistent and nearly nonexistent.170 A
district court judge held in October 2018 that a number of the
Missouri parole board’s policies, practices, and customs have
deprived “meaningful and realistic opportunity to secure release
upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”171 The judge
ordered the state to fix the policies within sixty days to allow for
juvenile offenders to have a realistic opportunity in front of a
parole board to prove they are worthy of parole.172
Arkansas: A Moderate Law
In Arkansas, the legislature passed the Fair Sentencing of
Minors Act (FSMA) in 2017,173 which allowed prisoners sentenced
as juveniles to become eligible for parole after twenty-five years
for first degree murder and thirty years for capital murder.174 The
FSMA meant that “[o]ffenders re-sentenced under the law would
still be given life terms, and it would be up to the Parole Board to
approve the release of the inmates.”175 Although the FSMA had
bipartisan support for protecting juvenile offenders, inmates did
not favor it because prior to the introduction of this Act, inmates
charged with murder were able to go before a judge to seek new
See MO. REV. STAT. § 558.047.
See Robert Patrick, Missouri Violated Rights of Inmates Convicted as
Juveniles Who Are Serving Life Without Parole, Judge Says, STL. TODAY (Oct. 14, 2018),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/missouri-violated-rights-ofinmates-convicted-as-juveniles-who-are/article_5f507dc8-0442-5319-8269-aa645f
ab0a38.html [https://perma.cc/5W6P-ZWN8].
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 S.B. 294, 91st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017).
174 John Moritz, High Court Rules on Youth Terms, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE
(Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/sep/22/high-court-rules-onyouth-terms-2017092-1/ [https://perma.cc/88DB-334D].
175 Id.
169
170

The Parole Board shall ensure that a hearing to consider the parole eligibility
of a person who was a minor at the time of the offense that was committed
before, on, or after March 20, 2017, takes into account how a minor offender is
different from an adult offender and provides a person who was a minor at the
time of the offense that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017,
with a meaningful opportunity to be released on parole based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-621.
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sentences for ten to forty years or life with parole.176 Before the
FSMA, inmates also had the possibility to receive time off for good
behavior; therefore, inmates previously had a greater chance to
serve less time than they would in the best possible outcome
under the FSMA.177 In May 2018, the Arkansas Supreme Court
noted that “[t]he emergency clause of the FSMA states
that . . . under the Miller and Montgomery decisions . . . the
[FSMA] is immediately necessary in order to make [juvenile
offenders] eligible for parole.”178 The Arkansas Supreme Court
approved judges in the state’s largest county to hear resentencing
hearings for juvenile offenders, which ultimately could set the
course of consistency for state courts in applying the FSMA.179
This ruling helps avoid all de facto LWOP for juvenile offenders.
Iowa: A Recent Total Ban
Following the lead of Miller, the Iowa General Assembly
enacted Iowa Code Sections 902.1(2) and (3) in 2015 that said a
juvenile who committed murder in the first degree shall be
sentenced to: “1) life with no possibility of parole unless the
Governor commutes the sentence; 2) life with the possibility of
parole after serving a minimum term of confinement determined
by the court; or 3) life with the possibility of parole.”180 A juvenile
who commits any felony other than first degree murder shall be
sentenced to “1) life with the possibility of parole after serving a
minimum term of confinement determined by the court; or 2) life
with the possibility of parole.”181 While this legislation eliminated
mandatory LWOP for juveniles, it still gave the judiciary
discretion to impose such sentences. Further, in 2018, using
Miller, the Supreme Court of Iowa found Section 902.1(2)(a)(1)
unconstitutional; therefore, the district court no longer has the
option to sentence a juvenile offender convicted of first degree
murder to LWOP.182 The state remained silent, however, on de
facto LWOP specifically.

Moritz, supra note 174.
Id.
178 Harris v. State, 547 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Ark. 2018) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
179 Arkansas Court OKs New Sentence Hearings for Juvenile Lifers, THV11
(May 25, 2018), https://www.thv11.com/article/news/local/arkansas-court-oks-newsentence-hearings-for-juvenile-lifers/91-558202885 [https://perma.cc/B9YE-FG8K].
180 JOSEPH MCENIRY, LEGISLATIVE SERV’S AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, at 5
(Dec. 2015), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/LG/14969.pdf [https://perma.
cc/V58T-F592]; see IOWA CODE § 902.1 (2), (3).
181 MCENIRY, supra note 180, at 5; see IOWA CODE § 901.1(3)(a).
182 See State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 836 (Iowa 2018).
176
177
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Nebraska: Opportunities for Parole Exist
In 2013, Nebraska passed a law stating that juveniles
who are convicted of the most serious crimes must serve forty
years to life.183 However, those juvenile offenders are eligible for
parole after serving at least half of their minimum sentence.184
This law requires the sentencing judges to consider the youth
related mitigating factors laid out in Miller, such as age and
intellectual capacity.185 Further, “[i]t also requires the state
parole board to review these inmates’ cases once a year after
they begin serving their sentences and consider similar
mitigating factors.”186 Therefore, juvenile offenders in Nebraska
cannot spend life in prison without a review for parole, which
effectively limits the possibility of de facto LWOP.
North Dakota: Not a Complete Ban, But Pretty Close
In April 2018, the North Dakota state legislature
unanimously passed House Bill No. 1195.187 “Under the new law,
individuals sentenced as children to lengthy prison terms are
entitled to have their sentences reviewed by judges after they
have served [twenty] years.”188 Further, if the petition is rejected,
the juvenile offender can reapply after an additional ten years.189
An earlier version of this bill called for a total ban on juvenile
LWOP, and to replace such sentencing with life with the
possibility of parole; however, “that option meant that juveniles
would still serve much longer than adults for their crimes,
because ‘life’ would be calculated at their life expectancy, and they
would be required to serve [eighty-five] percent of that time.”190 It
is rare that a juvenile is sentenced to life in prison in North
Dakota and the state has focused on “balanc[ing] the need to hold
[juveniles] accountable for harm they’ve caused and tak[ing] into
account their age and unique characteristics.”191
A State by State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, supra note 162.
Id.
185 Id.; see NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2204.
186 A State by State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, supra note 162.
187 See H.B. 1195, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (N.D. 2018); North Dakota Abolishes Juvenile
Life-Without-Parole Sentences, EQUAL JUST. INST. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://eji.org/news/northdakota-abolishes-juvenile-life-without-parole-sentences [https://perma.cc/Y3CW-M6BJ].
188 North Dakota Abolishes Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Sentences, supra note 187.
189 Caroline Grueskin, New ND Law Makes All Juveniles Eligible for Release
from Prison, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.grandforksherald.com/
news/4254307-new-nd-law-makes-all-juveniles-eligible-release-prison [https://perma.cc/
WQ8R-CBQA]; see H.B. 1195, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (N.D. 2018).
190 Grueskin, supra note 189.
191 Id.
183
184
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South Dakota: A Complete Ban on LWOP
Following Miller, in 2013, the South Dakota legislature
passed the Attorney General’s sponsored legislation to authorize,
but not mandate, LWOP for a juvenile offender if they are
convicted of a high-level felony.192 However, in 2016, South
Dakota eliminated juvenile LWOP by amending SDCL Section
22-6-1 and enacting SDCL Section 22-6-1.3.193 The new Section
22-6-1.3 states that, “[t]he penalty of life imprisonment may not
be imposed upon any defendant for any offense committed when
the defendant was less than eighteen years of age.”194 The
amended Section 22-6-1 provides that, “[i]f the defendant is under
the age of eighteen years at the time of the offense and found
guilty of a Class A, B, or C felony, the maximum sentence may be
a term of years in the state penitentiary.”195 The law, however,
remained silent on the possibility that such term of years
sentences could equate to de facto LWOP. Before these reforms
took place, South Dakota held one of the highest juvenile
incarceration rates; however, that number has steadily declined
and is currently lower than ever.196
IV.

REMEDYING THE INCREASING SPLIT

A.

Congressional Inaction

In 1984, Congress responded to a widespread call for
reform of federal sentencing by enacting the Sentencing Reform
Act (SRA).197 The goals of this act were to achieve honesty,
uniformity, and proportionality within the realm of sentencing
and it abolished discretionary release on parole.198 The federal
sentencing guidelines of the SRA went into effect in 1987 with
agreement on both sides of the political aisle that “the structured
192 Danielle Ferguson, 200-Year Sentence for Juvenile Upheld as Constitutional,
ARGUS LEADER (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/crime/2017/04/21/
200-year-sentence-juvenile-upheld-constitutional/100739086/ [https://perma.cc/PZY3-6KGJ].
193 See S.B. 140, 91st Sess., Legis. Assemb. (S.D. 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-6-1; South Dakota, JUV. SENT’G PROJECT (2019), https://juvenilesentencingproject.
org/south-dakota-sb140/ [https://perma.cc/9LS3-QTZS].
194 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1.3.
195 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1.
196 Mark Walker, South Dakota’s Juvenile Justice Reforms Led to Fewer
Children Sentenced, ARGUS LEADER (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.argusleader.com/story
/news/2017/09/04/after-reforms-fewer-kids-sentenced-incarceration-after-convictionsouth-dakota-juvenile-justice/598347001/ [https://perma.cc/22SP-LQ35].
197 Amy L. Anderson & Cassia Spohn, Lawlessness in the Federal Sentencing
Process: A Test for Uniformity and Consistency in Sentence Outcomes, 27 JUST. Q. 362, 363
(2010); see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
198 Anderson & Spohn, supra note 197, at 363.

312

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1

sentencing reforms were designed to curb discretion and reduce
unwarranted disparity.”199 The SRA seemed to suggest a
relatively neutral solution to a growing problem of sentencing
issues in the country.200
Today, the failure of both state legislatures and federal
courts to uniformly apply Miller, combined with Congress’s
inaction, has only escalated the detrimental effects of this
confusion.201 In 2015, the House of Representatives introduced a
resolution titled “Expressing the need to eliminate life without
parole for children.”202 However, Congress merely introduced the
bill before it was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, where no
further action has since been taken.203 In 2009, Congress
entertained the idea of mandating states to require that juveniles
have the opportunity to parole hearings along with a proposal of
the Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of 2009
(JJAIA).204 JJAIA suggested the use of Congress’s Spending
Power205 “to condition federal funds allocated for crime control on
states’ creation of meaningful parole or supervised release
199
200

Id.
The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission whose goal is to

1. establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal
justice system that assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing;
2. provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records that have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct; and
3. reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human
behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.
Sentencing Reform Act and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com
/s/sentencing-reform-act/ [https://perma.cc/YS2E-B3N5].
201 See Perry L. Moriearty, The Trilogy and Beyond, 62 S.D. L. REV. 539, 540–
41 (2017) (“[S]ome state legislatures have readily incorporated [the Supreme Court’s]
developmental framework into their juvenile life without parole sentencing schemes,
while others have yet to take any action at all. The net effect is ‘an incoherent patchwork’
of responses to Graham and Miller in some states, alongside the rapid rejection of
juvenile life without parole as a punishment in others.” (footnotes omitted)).
202 Expressing the Need to Eliminate Life Without Parole for Children, H.R.
Res. 382, 114th Cong. (2015).
203 Expressing the Need to Eliminate Life Without Parole for Children, H.R.
Res. 250, 115th Cong. (2017).
204 Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s
One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 413 (2011); see
Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act, H.R. 2289, 111th Cong. (2009).
205 Spending Power, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/spending_power [https://perma.cc/Q47K-WBCY] (“Under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution, Congress is granted the power to lay and collect
taxes in order to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and General Welfare
of the United States. As required by United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), Congress
must exercise its power to tax and spend for the general welfare.” (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

2019]

WHERE ARE YOU, CONGRESS?

313

opportunities for individuals convicted of crimes they committed
before the age of eighteen.”206 Members of the House of
Representatives introduced this version of JJAIA in 2007, 2009,
and again in 2011, but no versions ever made it out of the
introductory stages.207
In December 2018, Congress and the President signed a
revised version of JJAIA, under a larger bill, the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA).208 However, the Act is
unspecific, merely promising to evaluate the impact and outcomes
that prosecution has on juveniles in the criminal justice system.209
Although the signing of this Act is a positive step for the
treatment of juveniles in federal prisons, the unspecific nature
and broad accountability would fail to provide any prevention of
de facto life sentences for juvenile offenders.210 Similarly,
Congress signed the First Step Act in December 2018, which also
focused on prison reform, but failed to specifically protect
juveniles sentenced to LWOP in the federal prison system.211
Until Congress passes a bill directly banning juvenile LWOP and
de facto LWOP in federal prisons, children around the country
may still find themselves spending their entire life in prison.
Congress has continuously introduced bills expressing
contempt with juvenile LWOP sentencing, which demonstrates
the legislature’s ongoing desire to improve the treatment of
juvenile offenders. However, Congress has not taken a clear
stance on juvenile LWOP, which has led to inconsistencies in
federal application and thus, state application. Although
Congress could only enact sentencing guidelines and restrictions
for those convicted of federal crimes, it is possible that Congress’s
input would provide a template for states and give advocates
additional leverage to challenge state sentences. Further, states
Hechinger, supra note 204, at 413.
The JJAIA was introduced in the House of Representatives and was referred
to the House Committee on the Judiciary and then referred to the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security where it remained untouched. See id.; Juvenile Justice
Accountability and Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 3305, 112th Cong.
208 Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, H.R. 6964, 115th Cong.
209 See Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, H.R. 6964, 115th Cong. § 207.
210 “The JJDPA sets core safety standards for juvenile offenders that states
must follow in order to qualify for federal grants. It also aims to prevent delinquency and
curb racial and ethnic disparities in juvenile justice systems.” Lacey Johnson, JJPDA
Reauthorization Passes Congress After 16 Years, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Dec. 18,
2018), https://jjie.org/2018/12/13/jjdpa-reauthorization-passes-congress-after-16-years/
[https://perma.cc/MWP5-BGXY].
211 First Step Act of 2018, PL 115-391, Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat 5194. See
Angelina Chapin, Crime Bill Would Not Prevent Kids from Being Sentenced to Die in
Prison, Advocates Say, HUFFPOST (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
first-step-act-juvenile-sentence-life-without-parole_us_5c097d8fe4b04046345a4049
[https://perma.cc/6LWD-6S63].
206
207
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are scattered in their approach to juvenile sentencing and any
base-level sentence Congress indicated would be beneficial.212
B.

The United States Stands Alone

The international community has continuously rejected
juvenile LWOP but has remained silent on de facto LWOP
specifically. The Convention on the Rights of the Child expressly
prohibits juvenile LWOP213 and has been ratified by every country
in the world except the United States.214 Even after Miller, the
United States is the only country in the world that still sentences
juveniles to LWOP.215 Although “a 2012 study identified nine
countries . . . whose laws could potentially allow for a [juvenile]
LWOP sentence,” none have imposed such a sentence outside of
the United States.216
Although its view of LWOP is clear, the international
community has not spoken directly about de facto LWOP.
However, in 2013, the Human Rights Advocates, Inc.217 submitted
a written statement to the UN Secretary-General that discussed
violations of international standards.218 Specifically, the
statement addressed how countries issue consecutive sentences,
which can result in individuals across the world serving de facto
LWOP through decades-long stacked sentences.219 It found that
212
213

See supra Sections III.A, B.
Such sentences also violate:

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[;] United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice[;] United
Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency[;] United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment[;] American Declaration of the Rights of Duties of Man[; and] InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture[.]
Position Statement 58: Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders, MENTAL HEALTH AM.,
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/life-without-parole-juveniles#_ftn1
[https://perma.cc/UE4H-MUSV].
214 Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country that Hasn’t Ratified the Convention
on Children’s Rights: US, ACLU (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/humanrights/treaty-ratification/theres-only-one-country-hasnt-ratified-convention-childrens
[https://perma.cc/K3PF-KS78].
215 Connie De Le Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in
Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 985 (2008).
216 COLUMBIA LAW SCH., HUMAN RIGHTS INST., CHALLENGING JUVENILE LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE: HOW HAS HUMAN RIGHTS MADE A DIFFERENCE?, at 2 (2014), https://
www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/jlwop_
case_study_hri_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ELS-DQDY].
217 This is a non-governmental organization in special consultative status.
Written Statement from Human Rights Advocates Inc. to U.N. Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/22/NGO/53 (Feb. 14, 2013), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/743851/files/
A_HRC_22_NGO_53-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN3Y-975E].
218 Id. at 2.
219 Id. at 3.
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“the United States is among only [thirty-six] countries ([twentyone percent]) that continue to allow concurrent sentencing
without any cap.”220 In contrast to the United States, the
International Criminal Court judges must impose separate
sentences for each crime, and “[t]he maximum sentence must be
no less than the highest individual sentence pronounced and is
capped at either [thirty] years or life imprisonment, which is itself
reviewable after [twenty-five] years.”221
The United States has remained hesitant to follow the
international custom of preventing life sentences through
consecutive sentences for juveniles. A major step in resolving the
inconsistency among states and circuits in the United States is
to follow suit with the other major international governing
bodies. The United States, through both the Supreme Court and
Congress, ought to create a remedy to reduce the ability of the
judiciary to sentence juvenile offenders to de facto LWOP.222
C.

Calling on the Supreme Court

Given that courts continue to apply Miller inconsistently, at
the next opportunity, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
ensure the consistent treatment of juvenile offenders across the
country.223 The circuit split was a result of the Supreme Court’s
220

Id. The research found that:

Seventy-nine countries in the world do not have consecutive sentences or
mandate that the lesser offenses must merge with the most serious offense
when both are a part of the same act. Forty-four other countries cap the length
of time allowed for consecutive sentences; while some countries, like North
Korea, have a general cap on all consecutive sentences, and others, like
Finland, have a cap for some offenses, but no cap for grave offenses or violent
crimes. Eleven others, among them Sweden, Iceland and Hungary, issue only
one sentence by enhancing the greatest underlying offense by a mandatory but
capped certain number of years or percentage.
Id. (footnotes omitted). It is important to note that this is the most updated set of data that
has been published since 2013.
221 SOO-RYUN KWON ET AL., UNIV. S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U. S.
SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT, at 40 (2012). Although the power of the
International Criminal Court judges is referring to LWOP for general offenders, it can be
assumed that if this court prevents LWOP for adults, it is even more likely to take
precautions against juvenile LWOP.
222 See Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), JUV. L. CTR., https://jlc.org/
issues/juvenile-life-without-parole [https://perma.cc/9CDT-VTB7] (“It is far more expensive
to lock individuals up for life than to invest in our schools and our communities. These
sentencing practices don’t make us safer, and they deny youth who have demonstrated
growth and maturity the chance to rejoin their families and communities[ ] and contribute
to those communities in meaningful and productive ways.”)
223 In March of 2019, the Supreme Court decided to hear Mathena v. Malvo, to
decide whether Lee Malvo, who participated in the infamous Washington, D.C. sniper
shootings when he was seventeen, was unconstitutionally sentenced to life in prison without
parole. Although this case is crucial for juvenile rights in the United States, it is unlikely that
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unspecific ruling about how to handle juvenile LWOP. It is crucial
for the Supreme Court to be as specific as possible if they were to
hear a case regarding de facto juvenile LWOP again. If the Court
were not specific enough in its effort to remedy this issue, these
inconsistencies would remain even if the Court blatantly held de
facto LWOP to be unconstitutional. This is because if, for example, a
court determines a male’s life expectancy to be seventy-two years,
the Eighth Circuit may sentence a juvenile to something just shy of
those years.224 In that way, an offender would practically spend their
entire life in prison without being sentenced to de facto LWOP and
therefore evade any constitutional violations. Judicial discretion is
important; however, an excessive “subjective sentencing procedure
will surely not enable a judge to reliably identify the rare incorrigible
[offender].”225 It is, perhaps, most important to narrowly decide a
case that either completely bans or allows de facto LWOP for
juvenile offenders.
D.

A Suggested Solution: Congressional Limits on
Sentencing

Due to the scattered views on juvenile sentencing across
the states and the judiciary, it is crucial for Congress to have an
input on the progression of this split to settle the debate and
create a uniform application of Miller on the federal level.
Allowing discretion to the judges is a positive contribution since
most cases depend on the facts at hand in each case. The best
solution for Congress, however, is to lay out a rule that
completely bans de facto LWOP, yet still allows judges to have
some discretion in sentencing. As such, a judge could choose the
appropriate amount of years for each offender.
Ideally, there would be a maximum of twenty years and
then the juvenile would have a resentencing hearing. The new
sentence given would not exceed an additional fifteen years.
Therefore, if a court sentenced an offender at seventeen years old,
the maximum amount of time they would spend in prison would
be thirty-five years, making them fifty-two years old when they
are able to leave prison. This way, the most dangerous juvenile
offenders would have the opportunity to spend a substantial
the Court will extend its ruling to discuss de facto LWOP without being specifically requested.
See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Hear Case of Lee Malvo, the D.C. Sniper, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/us/politics/lee-malvo-supreme-court.
html [https://perma.cc/4TMJ-5NG6]. At the time of publication, there are no cases pending to
the Court specifically addressing de facto LWOP.
224 See Mark T. Freeman, Meaningless Opportunities: Graham v. Florida and
the Reality of de Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 982–83 (2014).
225 Hoesterey, supra note 62, at 183.
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amount of time in prison and be properly rehabilitated, as Miller
initially intended with its language. At the same time judges
would maintain discretion and determine, based on the crime,
how long a juvenile offender should spend in prison under the
limitations given. This note proposes adding a paragraph to the
current 18 U.S.C. § 5032 statute,226 which would authorize the
courts to reduce the terms of imprisonment imposed on
defendants convicted as adults for offenses committed before
defendants have reached eighteen years of age. The new
paragraph would look as follows:
Regarding the sentencing of defendants convicted for crimes
committed prior to attaining eighteen years of age: (1) a juvenile
sentenced to more than twenty years in prison for an act committed
prior to their eighteenth birthday shall have the opportunity to have
a resentencing hearing after spending twenty years in prison, and (2)
such resentencing hearing shall not commit the offender to more than
fifteen additional years in prison.

While many prominent criminal justice reform scholars and
advocacy organizations have begun to call for a reduction, and even
abolition, of youth incarceration, this note provides a meaningful
step forward to ensure that youth sentencing is conducted in a
uniform and just manner while simultaneously ensuring those who
have committed crimes are held accountable.227 A utilitarian
calculus of these reform models, including widespread reduction or
abolition, exposes considerable issues in today’s society; indeed,
there is a “logic behind deterrence . . . [that] is firmly rooted in the
utilitarian calculus that to deter the rational offender requires the
pain of imprisonment to outweigh the pleasure derived from
crime.”228 Further, it is understood that “[c]rime governance thrives
when we are able to imagine we have addressed interpersonal
violence, theft, and other problems by depositing certain people in
prison.”229 To be most effective, prisons must be regulated properly
226 Delinquency proceedings in district courts; transfer for criminal prosecution,
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012).
227 For further analysis on these scholars and advocacy organizations, see
generally Youth Incarceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/youth
-incarceration [https://perma.cc/MDN8-FYHZ]; Lindsay Rosenthal, The Initiative to End
Girls’ Incarceration, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/projects/the-initiative-toend-girls-incarceration/learn-more [https://perma.cc/8WRH-WMXH]; Reducing Youth
Incarceration, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., https://www.aecf.org/work/juvenile-justice/reduc
ing-youth-incarceration/ [https://perma.cc/WN93-NX95].
228 Ruairí Arrieta-Kenna, ‘Abolish Prisons’ Is the New ‘Abolish ICE’, POLITICO MAG.
(Aug. 15. 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/15/abolish-prisons-is-thenew-abolish-ice-219361 [https://perma.cc/2MGS-79Q5] (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting criminologist David Scott).
229 Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 1156, 1211 (2015).
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to achieve its rehabilitative nature. Therefore, this proposed law
would adhere to a utilitarian calculus and would comply with Miller
by requiring an opportunity for release while considering youthrelated factors to mitigate; yet still allow for initial judicial discretion
and reasonable punishment for crimes. With such a law, juvenile
offenders could serve time for the crimes they committed, while
simultaneously allowing offenders to be free of crimes they
committed while they were young and immature. Ultimately,
boundaries on discretion are important in order to maintain
consistency in juvenile sentencing and ensure fair treatment among
similarly situated offenders. Such guidelines and restrictions from
Congress would provide a template for states to create a uniform
standard and give advocates additional leverage for challenging
seemingly unconstitutional state and court standards.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court decided in Miller that juvenile
offenders deserved a chance for resentencing due to their ability to
be rehabilitated, prison doors across the country far from flew open.
There has been an ongoing battle among the circuits and the states
about how to handle juvenile sentencing. As courts in the Third
Circuit try to apply Miller through its plain meaning, juvenile
offenders are likely to feel freedoms that others might never
experience. At the same time, courts in the Eighth Circuit attempt
to use their own interpretations of Miller through a formalistic
approach, leaving juvenile offenders still spending their lives in
prison for childhood crimes. A Congressional solution banning de
facto LWOP altogether would be ideal in order to ensure fairness
in the criminal justice system today. A solution is in sight, and
together we must reach it for the sake of our future.
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